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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper assesses the state of governance in thirteen Caribbean Small States (CSS) by 
comparing these states among themselves, utilising global indicators relating to political 
governance, economic growth and GDP per capita. The main finding is that the governance 
scores and the GDP per capita in these states differ considerably, but there is a positive 
correlation between the two variables. On the other hand, the governance scores in the CSS 
tend to be negatively correlated with economic growth. These correlation patterns are similar 
globally. The paper delves deeper into the correlation between governance and economic 
growth and postulates that economic growth is related to improvements in governance and 
not the level of governance, arguing that a given governance improvement effort is likely to 
have a higher effect in a country with a lower level of governance. This assumption is termed 
“diminishing marginal governance effect”. The test of this assumption indicates that 
economic growth does indeed relates to improvements in governance, keeping the stage of 
development constant.  
 
JEL Classification: O16- Economic Development and Governance; O43 - Institutions and 
Growth; E02 – Institutions and the Macroeconomy;  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The paper assesses the state of governance in 13 Caribbean Small States (CSS) by comparing 
these states among themselves, utilising global indicators relating to political governance, 
economic growth and GDP per capita. 
 
The governance indicator used in this study is the Rule of Law dimension of the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators. The study also correlates this index with GDP per capita and 
economic growth, so as to comment on the presumption that good political governance is 
associated with these two variables. The simple correlations indicate that there is a positive 
relationship between governance levels and GDP per capita but a negative relationship 
between governance levels and economic growth. 
 
The paper delves deeper into the correlation between governance and economic growth and 
postulates that economic growth is related to improvements in governance and not the level 
of governance, arguing that a given governance improvement effort is likely to have a higher 
effect in a country with a lower level of governance. This assumption is termed “diminishing 
marginal governance effect”. The test of this assumption indicates that economic growth does 
indeed relate to improvements in governance, keeping the stage of development constant.  
 
The paper is organised in six sections. Following this introductory section, an overview of the 
thirteen CSS is presented. This is followed, in Section 3, by a brief literature review focussing 
on matters relating to the theme of the paper. Section 4 describes governance indicator used 
in this study and compares the governance scores among the CSS. Section 5 presents a deeper 
2 
 
look at the relationship between economic growth and governance, arguing that change in 
governance is the right variable to utilise when correlating it with economic growth. Section 
6 summarises the main tendencies derived from the previous section and derives a number of 
implications for the CSS. 
 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMIES OF THE CSS 
 
2.1 Countries differences  
 
The thirteen Caribbean Small States (CSS) covered in this study include five high income 
economies (HIE) namely Antigua/Barbuda, Barbados, Bahamas, Saint Kitts/Nevis and 
Trinidad/Tobago, seven upper-middle-income economics (UMIE), namely Belize, Grenada, 
Jamaica, St Lucia, St Vincent/Grenadines and Suriname and one lower-middle-income 
economy, namely Guyana.
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Over the 5-year period to 2013, the total population registered in CSS has increased by 0.2 
million to reach 7.1 million.  As illustrated in Figure 1, total population differs considerably 
across CSS. In particular, in 2013, Jamaica recorded the largest population close to 2.8 
million while St. Kitts/Nevis registered the lowest population at approximately 58 thousand. 
The GDP per capita of the CSS in 2013 differed considerably between one country and 
another as shown in Figure 2, with the Bahamas and Barbados registering the highest and 
Guyana, Belize, Suriname and Jamaica the lowest per capita income. The fastest growing 
countries between 2009 and 2013 were Guyana, Suriname and Belize (as can be seen in 
Table 1), which have a relatively low GDP per capita, which would seem to suggest a 
negative correlation between these two variables. This matter will be discussed further below.  
 
These differences between the individual CCS indicate that the averages for the whole group 
of countries should be interpreted with caution. 
 
Figure 1: Population (thousands)         Figure 2: GDP per Capita (US$) 
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The CSS also differ in their economic structure, with Belize, Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad 
and Tobago together produce oil/gas, minerals, and agricultural goods, and generally have 
registered higher growth rates than the other CSS, one reason being the positive impact of 
high commodity prices. The other CSS are mainly service-based economies, highly 
dependent on tourism and financial services, and highly exposed to external shocks.  
 
2.2 Country similarities 
 
A characteristic of the CSS is their high debt/GDP ratio. Ten of the 13 CSS had a gross debt 
ratio which was about or exceeded 60%, with Grenada, Jamaica and St Kitts/Nevis topping 
the list with a debt ratio of about 100% or over as can be seen from Figure 3.  
 
Yet, another characteristic is their negative current account balance. Almost all the CSS 
registered negative current account balance as an average over the 4 years between 2009 and 
2013, as can be seen from Figure 4, which expresses the current account balance as a 
percentage of GDP. The only exceptions were Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.  
 
Figure 3: Gross Debt /GDP (%)                   Figure 4: Current Account Balance/GDP (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The CSS are often considered as highly economically vulnerable countries. This means that 
CSS are inherently prone to exogenous economic shocks. Such vulnerability arises from the 
fact that the economies of small states are, to a large extent, shaped by forces outside their 
control. According to Briguglio (2014), such vulnerability is associated with for indicators 
namely trade openness, export concentration, dependence on strategic imports and proneness 
to natural disasters, the four of which are relatively high in the CSS, as shown in Figure 5, 6, 
7 and 8. 
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Figure 5: Trade Openness (%) 
2
                     Figure 6: Export Concentration (%)
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Dependence on Strategic imports (%)
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   Figure 8: Natural disaster proneness (%)
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According to Briguglio (2014) these realities rendered the thirteen Caribbean Small States 
amongst the most economically vulnerable countries in the world. 
 
 
3. BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
In this section, we consider three aspects of the literature, closely related to this study, namely 
(a) the state of governance in the CSS (b) the correlation between good governance and 
economic performance and (c) the governance record in the Caribbean Small States.  
 
3.1 State of governance in the CSS 
 
Brown (2010) noted that the situation in the CSS is often romanticised, accompanied by 
pictures of white beaches, but the reality on the ground is different and characterised by a 
number of governance weaknesses including organizational structures that are hierarchical, 
bureaucratic, inflexible and paternalistic leadership at both political and bureaucratic levels. 
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The author identified what he calls six binding constraints which adversely affect 
institutional development that are needed for good governance namely that (a) government is 
all-pervasive in both social and economic spheres (b) per capita cost of public administration 
and social and economic infrastructure is higher than in larger economies due to the 
indivisibility problem (c) weak tax base and an over-reliance on border revenues leading to 
chronic fiscal vulnerability (d) general capital constraints leading to high debt levels (e)  
limited pool of skilled human resources to perform the vital roles of the public service and a 
lack of depth in specialization and (f) proneness to external shocks – including natural 
disasters. These realities, some of which being inherent and induced, lead, according to 
Brown, to weak governance in the CSS.  
 
Over the past two decades, the economic performance of the CSS reflects deep-rooted 
competitiveness problems (Acevedo et al., 2013). Such macro-economic imbalance 
performance has translated into high current account deficits, large indebtedness vis-à-vis the 
rest of the world, and more generally unsustainable external positions. The authors indicate 
that the external current accounts of the tourism-based countries have deteriorated 
consistently since the early to mid-1990s mostly due to weak public finances. They further 
show that the public sector in the Caribbean accounts for about a third of the external 
imbalance, and is the largest contributor to the deficit. The authors also argue that while 
many of the cost disadvantages are structural, some are policy driven, including high labour 
costs due to a high degree of unionization, high electricity costs reflecting sector 
inefficiencies and monopoly powers of providers, trade protectionism through tariffs and 
non-price restrictions, high cost of credit brought about by, inter alia, lengthy credit recovery 
processes due to judicial procedures, and in some countries overvaluation of the domestic 
currency. 
 
Acevedo et al. also acknowledge that many CSS attempted to reduce the debt problem by 
debt restructuring, but argue that lack of comprehensive economic reforms have limited the 
positive effects of such debt restructuring. Consequently, a number of Caribbean economies 
have been in a high debt-low growth trap for the past two decades, which the authors call “a 
silent debt crisis.” The authors further argue that reducing the high public debt in the CSS is 
crucial because of the risk of a fiscal crisis, the costs debt servicing, discouragement of 
private investment, and constraints on fiscal flexibility.  
 
In view of these weaknesses of the CSS, Shafik (2013), in a speech during the 2013 High-
Level Caribbean Forum, explained that the IMF recommends fiscal adjustment as an urgent 
manner through which the CSS can achieve a turnaround in the debt situation, mostly 
through lowering current government spending, as according to the IMF, cuts to current 
expenditure have been found to be the most growth-friendly approach. She stated that these 
countries must “do what it takes to raise growth” by improving their business environment 
and boost investor confidence and encourage private sector investment. Shafik also argued 
that the overall governance framework is critical, and the CSS must therefore strengthen 
technical capacities, laws and institutions to improve governance, arguing that research has 
linked higher public debt in small states with weak governance.  
 
Grenade (2012) again identifies factors that undermine effective governance in the CSS, 
including high exposure to external shocks, proneness to natural hazards, limitations on the 
ability to reap the benefits of economies of scale, a narrow production base and lack of 
diversification possibilities. However she also argues that the self-inflicted weaknesses in 
governance of the CSS including limited private sector capacity, inadequate human 
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resources, insufficient institutional capacity, limited infrastructural development and high 
public debt. The author refers to other factors that weaken governance in the CSS that 
generate instability and insecurity, namely the growth narco-trafficking, other organised 
crime and corruption. In these matters, the author argues that there is the need of regional 
cooperation and collective action because such activities have cross-border implications.  
 
Referring to regional governance, Grenade (2012) emphasises that this is an imperative for 
the Caribbean. She argues that when CARICOM was established in 1973, its original 
objectives were economic integration, functional co-operation and foreign policy co-
ordination. Over the years, CARICOM has achieved relative successes in the realm of 
functional co-operation She points out the sub-regional grouping of the Organisation of 
Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) is also pursuing deeper levels of integration and is 
strengthening its framework for sub-regional governance. Although many positive 
developments were registered as a result of regional cooperation, the author argues that there 
are major challenges that need to be addressed. The fact that CARICOM is a community of 
independent sovereign states, foreign policy harmonisation was often not possible, limiting 
the attainment of the regional potential in many economic aspects. She also argues that the 
adversarial political culture within member states does not lend itself to co-operation among 
political elites, and regional integration is thus held hostage to narrow partisan interests. 
 
3.2 Governance and GDP per capita 
 
Simple correlations between good governance indicators and GDP per capita of countries, as 
done in this study, indicate that there is a high degree of correlation between the two 
variables.  This relationship is confirmed in more rigorous and complicated studies on this 
issue, notably in Kaufman and Kraay (2002).
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There is however some debate about the direction of causality. Kaufman and Kraay (2002) 
show that per capita income and the quality of governance are strongly positively correlated 
across countries. They propose an empirical approach in order to assess the causality of the 
relationship, that is whether governance leads to prosperity or whether increases in income 
per capita lead to good governance. They find a strong positive causal effect running from 
better governance to higher per capita income, and a weak and even negative causal effect 
running in the opposite direction from per capita income to governance.  
 
3.3 Governance and economic growth 
 
This study also presents simple correlation coefficients between governance indictors and 
economic growth, which generally indicate that the relationship is not positive, and possibly 
negative.
7
 
 
Several publications associate good governance, and the necessary institutions for good 
governance, with growth. A substantial body of literature consider good governance as a 
precondition for growth (Kaufmann, 2005; Reynolds, 1983), and similarly with regard to 
governance institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2005; North; 1990; Rodrik, 1999; Aron, 2000; 
Commission on Growth and Development, 2008). The direction of causation of economic 
growth and governance is also a matter of debate, with some authors arguing in favour of the 
theory that growth comes first and governance and the accompanying institutions later (e.g. 
Durlauf et al., 2005; Glaeser et al., 2004). 
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The connection between growth and governance has been questioned by Kurtz and Schrank 
(2007) who doubt whether such a connection exists and queries whether the data used to 
measure governance as well as the methods used to estimate such a relationships are good 
enough.
8
   
 
Rodrik (2008) argues that there are many countries that are growing rapidly despite poor 
governance to render suspect any general claim to the contrary and governance is generally 
not a prerequisite for getting growth going. Rodrik (2008) opines that as a rule, broad 
governance reform is neither necessary nor sufficient for growth, and therefore a broad 
governance agenda rarely deserves priority as part of a growth strategy, except in rare 
instances where “weak governance is specifically identified as a generic area of binding 
constraints”. 
 
The literature on the effect of good governance on economic growth therefore sends 
contradictory signals, with some authors, notably Kaufman and Kraay (2002) arguing 
strongly in favour the connection and others, such as Rodrik (2008) and Kurts and Schrank 
(2007) arguing that there is no evidence that such a connection exists. 
  
It should be noted that the negative relationship between growth and good governance may 
be in line with neoclassical growth theory, given that the best-governed countries have high 
income economies. Theory predicts that low income countries would converge as, 
theoretically, they would tend to grow at a faster rate than higher income ones due to the law 
of diminishing marginal product with regard to capital, which is more abundant in developed 
countries. This neo-classical convergence theory is associated with Solow (1956),
9
 which 
leads to the argument that a country's growth rate tends to be inversely related to its starting 
level of income per capita.  
 
In addition, intuitively, one should think that economically backward countries can grow 
faster than advanced countries as the former countries can copy and adopt readily available 
technologies invented by countries that developed earlier. This catching-up technological 
laggards has been termed the “advantage of backwardness” by Gerschenkron (1952). 
 
Another argument, to be tested in this paper, but as far as we know, has not been tested 
elsewhere, is that the relationship between governance and real GDP growth is likely to be 
between changes, and not levels of governance. It is argued that what matters for economic 
growth, which is improvement in economic performance, are improvements in governance. It 
is further argued that governance improvements may be easier to achieve from a relatively 
low starting point. In other words it may be more difficult to improve governance once a 
country reaches or almost reaches a peak when compared to a country which has considerable 
room for improvement – a reality which may be termed as “diminishing marginal governance 
effect”.  
 
4. GOVERNANCE, GDP PER CAPITA AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE CSS 
 
The Rule of Law dimension of the Worldwide Governance Indicators was considered to be 
the best indictor to measure political governance, due to its definition
10
 and also because it 
covers a very wide number of countries, including all the thirteen CSS.
11
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The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)
12
 have six dimensions of governance, namely 
(1) voice and accountability (2) political stability and absence of violence (3) government 
effectiveness (4) regulatory quality (5) rule of law and (6) control of corruption.  The index 
covers a large number of countries. A detailed description of the methodology is given in 
Kaufmann et al. (2010).   
 
Table 1 shows how the CSS fared in terms of the Rule of Law indicator mentioned above. It 
can be seen that Barbados registered the highest score whereas Guyana the lowest score. In 
the index, the highest score is 2.5 and the lowest is -2.5. It can be seen that most CSS have a 
score above 0.  
 
Table 1: Rule of Law, GDP Per Capita and Economic Growth Indicators for the CSS  
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Score 
0.86 0.60 1.00 
-
0.45 0.63 0.16 -0.52 -0.39 0.73 0.75 0.86 -0.09 
-
0.22 
GDP PC $‘000 13.8 23.5 15.4 4.6 7.0 7.7 3.7 5.1 13.1 7.8 6.6 9.2 20.6 
GDP: 09-13 (%) -1.24 1.08 0.18 2.47 0.26 -0.02 4.96 -0.08 -0.69 -0.61 0.45 4.60 0.12 
Sources: World Bank (2014) for the WGI and IMF (2014) for GDP data.  
 
Table 1 also presents per capita GDP of the 13 CSS together with their real GDP average 
growth rate between 2010 and 2013.  In the case of the growth indicators,
13
 it appears that the 
fastest growth tended to occur in the countries with relatively low GDP per capita, namely 
Guyana, Suriname and Belize.  Conversely, Barbados, Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago, 
with high GDP per capita registered relatively low GDP growth rates. Thus it appears that 
that there is a tendency (with the clear exception of Trinidad and Tobago) that countries with 
the lowest GDP per capita tended to grow fastest.  
 
This is in line with the findings of many studies on the relationship between these variables, 
as indicated in the literature review. However, in the case of the CSS, a possible factor could 
have been that the non-commodity-exporting CSS, which are highly depend on tourism and 
financial services, tend to be more highly exposed to external shocks than the commodity-
exporting CSS, namely Belize, Guyana, Suriname (Trinidad and Tobago is an exception). 
This could partially explain the poor growth performance of the non-commodity-exporting 
CSS. 
 
The correlation between the governance indicators and GDP per capita in the Caribbean 
Small States is shown in Table 2. The correlation is positive, although it is not statistically 
significant.
14
 This table also shows simple correlation coefficients between governance 
indictors and economic growth, which generally indicate that the relationship is possibly 
negative.  
 
This tendency is also applicable globally, as shown in Table 1.  Again, GDP per capita tends 
to be positively correlated whereas real GDP growth tends to be negatively correlated with 
the governance indicators.  
 
Table 2: Correlations between Rule of Law indicators, GDP per Capita and Growth   
 Variable  
Correlation with 
WGI-RL 
Caribbean GPC 0.354
n
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Small States GDP 09-13 -0.489* 
Global  
(185 countries) 
GPC 0.725* 
GDP 09-13 -0.390* 
Source: IMF (2014); calculations by authors 
 
 
5. A DEEPER LOOK AT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC 
GROWTH AND GOVERNANCE 
 
In this section we try to answer the question as to why governance scores and economic 
growth seem to be negatively correlated to each other. As has been shown above in this 
study, a simple correlation between economic growth and governance indicators suggest that 
indeed the slowest growing countries tend to have the highest governance scores. However 
this does not mean that good governance is bad for growth. We argue in this paper that the 
equation should compare like with like, that is changes in real GDP should be compared with 
changes in governance, and not with its levels. The hypothesis can then be stated as follows: 
improvement in governance leads to economic growth that is improvement in real GDP.   
 
This assumption may also help to explain why GDP per capita is found to be positively 
correlated with governance scores and negatively correlated with economic growth. Although 
a country may register relatively low governance as well as low GDP per capita scores, it is 
likely to be easier for such a country to improve its governance from a relatively low starting 
point. In other words, a given governance improvement effort would have a higher effect in a 
low income and poorly governed country than in a high-income well-governed one. This 
possibility may be termed as “diminishing marginal governance effect”. 
 
To test this assumption, we specify a simple growth equation as follows: 
 
GDP = f (GVN, GPC, Log P) 
 
Where: 
GDPi = GDP growth in real terms during a given period in country i. 
GPCi is GDP per capita in country i. 
GVNi = changes in governance during the same period in country i. 
Log Pi = Log of the population size in country i.  
 
In this exercise, GDP is measured by percentage changes in GDP in real terms average over 
the years 2009 to 2013 (that is the period following the global financial crisis).  
 
As already explained, GDP per capita (GPC) is included in the equation as a proxy for the 
stage of development of a country, in order to allow for the possibility that low income 
countries would tend to grow at a faster rate than higher income countries in line with the so-
called convergence theory and to the possibility that backward countries tend to catch-up 
technologically, by amongst other things adopting technological advances previously created 
by more advanced countries. The sign of the coefficient on GPC is therefore expected to be 
negative. GDP per capita is measured in US dollars for the year 2013.  
 
Changes in governance are measured in terms of the Rule of Law dimension of the 
Worldwide Governance Indictors (WGI) between 2009 and 2013.  This index was chosen 
because its implications for political governance, because it has a wide coverage of countries 
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and also because it was produced by and large consistently during each year of the period 
under consideration.  The variable GVN is expected to have a coefficient with a positive 
sign, capturing the effects of governance improvements on growth 
 
The population variable was introduced in the equation to allow for the various constraints 
faced by small states, including their high exposure to external shocks and their limited 
ability to reap the benefits of economies of scale (Briguglio 2014).  The sign of the 
coefficient on this variable is expected to be positive. It is measured in logs to allow for the 
possibility that a country twice the size of another is less than twice disadvantaged in terms of 
growth.  
The GDP and population data was sourced from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database 
(IMF, 2014) and the Governance data was sourced from World Bank (2014). All data is 
presented in Appendix 1. 
 
The equation was first applied to the 13 Caribbean small states. The results, shown below, 
were not very promising in terms of statistical significance, although the signs of the 
coefficients on GVN and on GPC were respectively negative and positive as expected. 
 
GDPi  =  -1.59   -   0.09 GPCi  +  6.58 GVNi  +  1.44 LogPi  
     -0.5        -0.9         0.2                      1.1 
R
2 
= 0.27;     N=13 
 
The numbers in italics under the coefficients are t-statistics, indicating that the coefficients 
are not statistically significant at the 95% level of significance. This is not surprising, given 
that small number of countries involved.
15
   
 
The same equation was applied for 185 countries, and the results indicate that the coefficients 
were statistically significant, as shown below: 
 
GDPi  = 1.07  -   0.04 GPCi  +  13.31 GVNi +  0.85 LogPi  
1.1      -3.5                  2.8             3.6 
R
2 
= 0.17;     N=185 
 
The correlation coefficient improved considerable when a dummy variable (D) was 
introduced to capture the effect of the austerity programme which 5 euro-area countries were 
obliged to follow during the growth period under consideration. These are Cyprus, Ireland, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain. These results are shown below: 
 
GDPi  = 1.06   -    0.03 GPCi  +  11.48 GVNi +  0.87 LogPi -  4.91 Di  
1.2           -3.1        2.5                     3.8                -4.1 
R
2 
= 0.28;     N=185 
 
 
6. MAIN IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 Correlation between Governance, GDP per Capita and growth  
 
The indicators presented above, show first and foremost that desirable governance scores, be 
they political, economic or social, are correlated with GDP per capita.
 
This would seem to 
suggest that good governance is associated with economic prosperity. This conclusion, also 
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often found in the literature, supports intuitive thinking, given that good governance is likely 
to mean responsive administration, better institutional set-ups and more efficient utilisation of 
resources.  
 
The governance indicator considered in this study seems to be negatively correlated with 
economic growth among the thirteen CSS as well as at the global levels.  In the case of the 
CSS, Guyana and Suriname, which received relatively low governance scores, are the fastest 
growing economies among the CSS. Conversely Barbados and The Bahamas, the fastest 
growing CSS, registered relatively low growth rates.  
 
This would seem to contradict a commonly held view that growth and good governance go 
hand-in-hand. As has been shown in this paper, the relationship between governance and real 
GDP growth is likely to be between changes (and not levels) in the governance variables, 
given that governance improvements are more difficult to achieve in a country with high 
governance standards when compared to a country which has considerable room for 
improvement in this regard.  
 
Thus it makes sense to argue that improvement in governance is likely to improve the 
chances of economic growth, other things remaining constant. For example if one compares 
economic growth between two countries, A and B, which are in the same level of 
development and with the same level of governance, one would expect that country A would 
register a higher growth rate than country B during a given period, if country A improves its 
governance more than country B.  
 
A related argument is that if country A is less developed than country B, its catching-up 
performance is likely to improve with the same effort to improve governance due to the fact 
that a given governance effort is likely to have a higher affect in the country with a low level 
of governance when compared to the other country. As already explained this has been 
termed “diminishing marginal governance effect” 
 
Therefore the result of a negative correlation between GDP growth and governance should 
not be interpreted as an indication that good governance is undesirable for growth, and that it 
should not, therefore, be pursued. On the contrary, the fact that good governance and 
economic prosperity are correlated, in that the best governed countries tend to enjoy the 
highest standard of living, can be seen as a sign that well-governed countries do reap benefits 
in the form of high income per capita. This conclusion applies to the CSS, where the most 
prosperous small states are the best governed economies. 
 
The interesting results produced in this study, namely that improvements (as against levels) in 
political governance have a positive statistically significant effect on economic growth, given 
the stage of development, can be considered as an added piece of evidence that it pays to 
improve governance. There is some evidence that this tendency also applies to the CSS, but 
the relationship tested in this study for the thirteen small states lacked statistical significance, 
possibly due to the small number of observations.  
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APPENDIX 1: THE DATA  
(sources and meaning of the variables are explained in the text) 
Country 
  
GRTH  
09-13 
GPC   GVN Log P Dummy 
AFGHANISTAN 8.1 0.68 0.059 4.51 0 
ALBANIA 1.9 4.56 -0.010 3.51 0 
ALGERIA 3.1 5.61 0.019 4.56 0 
ANGOLA 4.8 5.96 -0.010 4.31 0 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA -1.2 13.73 -0.035 1.94 0 
ARGENTINA 5.4 14.71 -0.006 4.61 0 
ARMENIA 4.4 3.17 0.034 3.53 0 
AUSTRALIA 2.7 64.58 0.005 4.36 0 
AUSTRIA 1.4 49.04 0.010 3.93 0 
AZERBAIJAN 3.3 7.90 0.039 3.97 0 
BAHAMAS, THE 1.1 23.64 -0.046 2.55 0 
BAHRAIN 3.8 27.93 -0.050 3.06 0 
BANGLADESH 6.2 1.03 -0.014 5.18 0 
BARBADOS 0.2 15.17 0.006 2.44 0 
BELARUS 4.0 7.58 0.027 3.97 0 
BELGIUM 1.0 45.54 0.012 4.05 0 
BELIZE 2.5 4.62 -0.018 2.54 0 
BENIN 4.2 0.81 0.010 3.97 0 
BHUTAN 7.7 2.63 0.016 2.87 0 
BOLIVIA 5.3 2.79 0.017 4.03 0 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 0.7 4.62 0.047 3.59 0 
BOTSWANA 6.2 7.12 -0.015 3.27 0 
BRAZIL 3.4 11.17 0.024 5.30 0 
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM 1.3 39.66 -0.046 2.60 0 
BULGARIA 0.9 7.33 -0.016 3.86 0 
BURKINA FASO 7.3 0.71 -0.083 4.24 0 
BURUNDI 4.4 0.30 0.026 3.94 0 
CAMBODIA 7.0 1.03 0.024 4.18 0 
CAMEROON 4.4 1.33 0.017 4.33 0 
CANADA 2.4 52.04 -0.016 4.54 0 
CAPE VERDE 1.8 3.63 0.000 2.72 0 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC -6.4 0.33 -0.128 3.69 0 
CHAD 6.6 1.22 0.030 4.03 0 
CHILE 5.3 15.78 0.018 4.24 0 
CHINA 8.8 6.96 -0.034 6.13 0 
COLOMBIA 4.8 8.03 -0.005 4.67 0 
COMOROS 2.8 0.93 0.041 2.84 0 
CONGO, DEM. REP. 7.4 0.39 0.020 4.87 0 
CONGO, REP. 4.8 3.22 0.024 3.61 0 
COSTA RICA 4.5 10.53 -0.010 3.67 0 
CÔTE D'IVOIRE 4.3 1.33 0.083 4.37 0 
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CROATIA -1.4 13.40 0.031 3.64 0 
CYPRUS -1.5 24.87 -0.048 2.94 1 
CZECH REPUBLIC 0.6 18.87 0.017 4.02 0 
DENMARK 0.6 59.13 -0.012 3.75 0 
DJIBOUTI 4.4 1.59 -0.027 2.95 0 
DOMINICA 0.3 7.03 -0.015 1.85 0 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 4.6 5.88 0.058 4.01 0 
ECUADOR 5.2 5.94 0.075 4.18 0 
EGYPT, ARAB REP. 2.8 3.24 -0.136 4.92 0 
EL SALVADOR 1.8 3.84 0.031 3.79 0 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 0.5 20.60 -0.018 2.87 0 
ERITREA 4.8 0.54 -0.036 3.75 0 
ESTONIA 4.3 18.85 0.019 3.13 0 
ETHIOPIA 10.1 0.52 0.041 4.94 0 
FIJI 3.0 4.58 -0.021 2.95 0 
FINLAND 0.7 49.06 -0.012 3.73 0 
FRANCE 1.2 44.10 -0.007 4.80 0 
GABON 6.1 12.33 0.008 3.19 0 
GAMBIA, THE 3.5 0.45 -0.036 3.26 0 
GEORGIA 5.7 3.60 0.046 3.65 0 
GERMANY 2.2 45.00 -0.006 4.91 0 
GHANA 9.7 1.87 0.046 4.40 0 
GREECE -5.7 21.86 -0.045 4.05 1 
GRENADA 0.0 7.70 0.002 2.02 0 
GUATEMALA 3.4 3.47 -0.010 4.18 0 
GUINEA 3.0 0.56 0.030 4.04 0 
GUINEA-BISSAU 2.9 0.57 -0.065 3.20 0 
GUYANA 5.0 3.76 0.014 2.89 0 
HAITI 1.8 0.82 0.013 4.02 0 
HONDURAS 3.5 2.28 -0.077 3.91 0 
HONG KONG SAR, CHINA 4.0 37.96 0.015 3.86 0 
HUNGARY 0.5 13.39 -0.049 4.00 0 
ICELAND 0.8 45.42 -0.015 2.51 0 
INDIA 6.7 1.51 -0.031 6.09 0 
INDONESIA 6.2 3.51 0.010 5.39 0 
IRAN, ISLAMIC REP. 0.5 4.77 -0.010 4.88 0 
IRAQ 7.6 6.59 0.076 4.53 0 
IRELAND 0.6 48.61 -0.005 3.66 1 
ISRAEL 4.0 36.93 0.032 3.89 0 
ITALY -0.5 34.71 0.002 4.78 0 
JAMAICA -0.1 5.10 0.024 3.44 0 
JAPAN 1.8 38.47 0.028 5.11 0 
JORDAN 2.6 5.17 0.027 3.81 0 
KAZAKHSTAN 6.5 13.51 -0.010 4.22 0 
KENYA 6.3 1.32 0.077 4.62 0 
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KIRIBATI 2.0 1.55 -0.010 2.02 0 
KOREA, REP. 3.9 25.98 -0.010 4.70 0 
KUWAIT 3.9 45.19 -0.056 3.58 0 
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC 3.8 1.28 0.045 3.75 0 
LAO PDR 8.0 1.59 0.059 3.80 0 
LATVIA 3.3 15.19 -0.013 3.31 0 
LEBANON 3.5 10.08 -0.022 3.60 0 
LESOTHO 5.4 1.19 -0.007 3.28 0 
LIBERIA 7.6 0.48 0.041 3.60 0 
LIBYA 8.5 10.70 -0.129 3.81 0 
LITHUANIA 3.6 15.65 0.024 3.48 0 
LUXEMBOURG 1.7 112.47 -0.007 2.72 0 
MACEDONIA, FYR 2.0 4.93 0.018 3.32 0 
MADAGASCAR 1.6 0.46 -0.043 4.35 0 
MALAWI 4.5 0.22 -0.017 4.22 0 
MALAYSIA 5.8 10.46 -0.003 4.47 0 
MALDIVES 4.5 6.69 -0.128 2.52 0 
MALI 2.6 0.65 -0.100 4.21 0 
MALTA 2.4 22.89 -0.040 2.62 0 
MARSHALL ISLANDS 2.6 3.24 0.100 1.74 0 
MAURITANIA 5.5 1.13 -0.040 3.56 0 
MAURITIUS 3.6 9.16 -0.013 3.11 0 
MEXICO 3.6 10.65 0.007 5.06 0 
MICRONESIA, FED. STS. 1.4 3.22 -0.005 2.01 0 
MOLDOVA 5.5 2.24 0.016 3.55 0 
MONGOLIA 12.0 4.00 -0.023 3.45 0 
MONTENEGRO 1.7 7.11 -0.012 2.79 0 
MOROCCO 3.9 3.16 -0.014 4.51 0 
MOZAMBIQUE 7.2 0.59 -0.064 4.35 0 
MYANMAR 6.7 1.11 0.063 4.80 0 
NAMIBIA 5.3 5.64 0.008 3.33 0 
NEPAL 4.2 0.69 0.037 4.49 0 
NETHERLANDS 0.1 50.82 0.001 4.22 0 
NEW ZEALAND 2.3 40.52 -0.019 3.65 0 
NICARAGUA 4.6 1.83 0.036 3.78 0 
NIGER 6.4 0.45 -0.056 4.21 0 
NIGERIA 6.3 3.08 0.002 5.22 0 
NORWAY 1.3 100.58 0.020 3.70 0 
OMAN 4.9 21.46 -0.025 3.49 0 
PAKISTAN 3.4 1.27 -0.009 5.25 0 
PANAMA 9.4 10.88 -0.028 3.56 0 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 8.0 2.10 -0.008 3.83 0 
PARAGUAY 7.4 4.28 0.033 3.82 0 
PERU 6.7 6.54 0.013 4.48 0 
PHILIPPINES 6.3 2.79 0.043 4.98 0 
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POLAND 3.0 13.44 0.047 4.59 0 
PORTUGAL -1.0 21.00 -0.003 4.02 1 
QATAR 10.6 98.99 0.008 3.26 0 
ROMANIA 1.3 8.87 0.018 4.33 0 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 3.4 14.59 -0.004 5.15 0 
RWANDA 6.8 0.70 0.087 4.02 0 
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS -0.7 13.26 -0.006 1.76 0 
SAINT LUCIA -0.6 7.89 -0.025 2.23 0 
SAINT VINCENT AND THE 
GRENADINES 0.5 6.56 -0.006 2.04 0 
SAMOA 0.9 4.16 0.018 2.26 0 
SÃO TOMÉ AND PRINCIPE 4.4 1.63 -0.025 2.24 0 
SAUDI ARABIA 6.4 24.95 0.026 4.46 0 
SENEGAL 3.2 1.05 0.024 4.12 0 
SERBIA 0.9 5.90 0.025 3.88 0 
SEYCHELLES 5.0 14.92 -0.005 1.96 0 
SIERRA LEONE 11.7 0.81 0.010 3.79 0 
SINGAPORE 6.9 55.18 0.035 3.73 0 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 2.5 17.71 -0.013 3.74 0 
SLOVENIA -0.5 23.32 -0.022 3.31 0 
SOLOMON ISLANDS 6.3 1.94 0.034 2.75 0 
SOUTH AFRICA 2.8 6.62 0.008 4.71 0 
SPAIN -0.8 29.15 -0.034 4.66 1 
SRI LANKA 7.5 3.20 -0.051 4.32 0 
SUDAN 0.6 1.94 -0.005 4.53 0 
SURINAME 4.6 9.21 0.020 2.74 0 
SWAZILAND 1.5 3.47 0.048 3.03 0 
SWEDEN 3.0 58.01 -0.003 3.98 0 
SWITZERLAND 1.9 81.28 0.009 3.90 0 
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 3.4 3.00 -0.248 4.34 0 
TAIWAN, CHINA 4.6 20.92 0.030 4.37 0 
TAJIKISTAN 7.2 1.04 -0.003 3.90 0 
TANZANIA 6.8 0.72 -0.007 4.67 0 
THAILAND 4.3 5.68 0.023 4.81 0 
TIMOR-LESTE 9.3 4.14 -0.009 3.07 0 
TOGO 5.0 0.64 -0.032 3.80 0 
TONGA 1.5 4.57 0.026 2.02 0 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 0.1 20.62 0.002 3.12 0 
TUNISIA 1.7 4.32 -0.100 4.03 0 
TURKEY 6.0 10.72 -0.006 4.87 0 
TURKMENISTAN 11.3 7.16 0.015 3.75 0 
UGANDA 5.2 0.62 0.015 4.55 0 
UKRAINE 2.4 3.93 -0.013 4.66 0 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 4.1 44.55 0.045 3.74 0 
UNITED KINGDOM 1.2 39.37 -0.013 4.80 0 
18 
 
UNITED STATES 2.2 53.00 -0.010 5.50 0 
URUGUAY 6.0 16.42 -0.045 3.53 0 
UZBEKISTAN 8.3 1.88 0.017 4.47 0 
VANUATU 1.7 3.00 -0.032 2.40 0 
VENEZUELA, RB 2.4 7.58 -0.050 4.47 0 
VIETNAM 5.8 1.90 -0.003 4.96 0 
YEMEN, REP. 0.6 1.52 -0.018 4.41 0 
ZAMBIA 7.5 1.85 0.045 4.14 0 
ZIMBABWE 9.3 1.01 0.068 4.11 0 
 
                                                 
1
 As of 1 July 2014, the World Bank defined middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita (GNI 
per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method) of more than $1,045 but less than $12,746; high-
income economies are those with a GNI per capita of $12,746 or more. Lower-middle-income and upper-
middle-income economies are separated at a GNI per capita of $4,125. The CSS do not include a low-income 
economy which is defined as one with a GNI per capita, of $1,045 or less in 2013. Information available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups#Lower_middle_income.  
2
 Trade openness is measured as the average of exports and imports of goods and services as a percentage of 
GDP. Source:  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=95 . 
3
 Export concentration is measured as the sum of the three broad groups of exports of goods and services which 
together take the highest percentage of total exports of goods and services. This is then expressed as a 
percentage of total exports of goods and services. The procedure used was to group exports into 14 categories, 
of which there were 10 broad groups of merchandise, as per SITC one-digit classification, and the remaining 4 
were services grouped under the headings of Transport, Travel, Financial Services and Other Services.  Source: 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx under the heading “International trade in goods 
and services”.  The data were averaged over three years 2009-2011. 
4
 The “dependence on strategic imports” index is measured as the imports of food and fuel as a percentage of 
total merchandise imports. Source: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx  under the 
heading “International trade in goods and services”. The variables were averaged over three years 2009-2011. 
5
 The disaster proneness index was measured in terms of economic damage relative to GDP. The source of the 
data was the EM-DAT Database, available at: http://www.emdat.be/database  covering a period of about three 
decades (1980 to 2011).   
6
 See Baland et al (2009) for a discussion on this relationship.  
7
 The correlation results produced in this study should be interpreted with caution as here we are not keeping 
control variables constant and not capturing the possible reverse casual effect of growth on governance. It is 
acknowledged that the approach adopted in this study is somewhat simplistic, and that regressing GDP per 
capita and economic growth against the governance indices listed in this study, together with a number of 
control variables would have produced more rigorous results. One suspects that a more rigorous approach would 
have yielded a similar outcome and as Rodrik (2008) argues, there is no strong econometric evidence that relates 
standard governance criteria to growth. 
8
 See also Sundaram and Chowdhury (2012) for studies that question the governance and growth connection. 
9
 See also Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). 
10
 Kaufman et al. (2010) define this index as one that captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.  The indicators are based on the 
views of persons involved in business, ordinary citizens and expert surveys, with sources derived from various 
institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms.   
11
 The 2013 WGI covers 215 countries and non-independent territories, but this study reduces the number to 184 
independent countries for which data on GDP per capita and real economic growth were available 
12
 The 2013 WGI scores are available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home . 
13
 As can be seen from the tables, two growth indicators were selected one representing the post-crisis years 
(2010-2013) and the other a longer-term period (2003-2013).    
14
 The test of significance was conducted by regressing GPD per capita and real GDP growth on the governance 
indicators and finding the t-statistic relating to this relationship. The asterix on the correlation coefficients 
indicates that those coefficient are different from zero at the 95% level of statistical significance, while a 
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superscripted n indicates the non-significant coefficients. It should be noted that such simple correlations should 
be interpreted with caution as no control variables are included in the equation.  
15
 Panel data regression was also tried to increase the number of observations, but the results did not change 
markedly. 
